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REZONING BY AMENDMENT AS AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE OR QUASI-JUDICIAL ACT: 
THE "NEW LOOK" IN MICHIGAN ZONING 
Roger A. Cunningham* 
T HE traditional view in zoning law has been that the enactment of an original zoning ordinance and any amendments thereto 
by a local governing body is a "legislative" act,1 as contrasted with 
the granting of a "special exception" or a "variance" by the zoning 
board of appeals (or board of adjustment),2 which is an "adminis-
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. S.B. 1942, J.D. 1948, Harvard Univer• 
sity.-Ed. 
I. Fasano v. Board of County Commrs., 264 Ore. 574, 579, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973) 
("The majority of jurisdictions state that a zoning ordinance is a legislative act and is 
thereby entitled to presumptive validity"). In Fasano, the court also cited Smith v. 
County of Washington, 241 Ore. 380, 383, 406 P.2d 545, 547 (1965), for the further 
proposition that "a challenged [zoning] amendment is a legislative act and is clothed 
with a presumption in its favor." 264 Ore. at 579, 507 P .2d at 26. See also I A. RATH-
KOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 27-13 to -14 (3d ed. 1974): "The mere 
enactment of the original [zoning] ordinance gives rise to certain presumptions, i.e., 
that the restrictions are reasonable and appropriate to cure [or] prevent an evil seen 
or reasonably to be apprehended; that they are adequate for this purpose; that the 
boundaries of the districts established are similarly reasonable •••• Upon the amend-
ment of the ordinance, either in the form of a complete revision or replacement or 
with respect to a particular case [or] piece of property, the presumption applies to the 
new legislation, in most jurisdictions without comment or disparity as to its weight." 
(Footnotes omitted.) See generally Freilich, Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners 
of Washington County: Is Rezoning an Administrative or Legislative Function?, 6 
URBAN LAW. vii (1974); Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or 
Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1972); 57 MICH. L. R.Ev. 423 (1959). 
2. All zoning ordinances provide some sort of administrative relief for persons 
severely disadvantaged by their impact. A few authorize a zoning administrator to 
make minor concessions where certain regulations are seriously injurious to an 
individual landowner and of little benefit to the community under the circum-
stances. • • • But most ordinances establish an administrative board with broad 
powers to review administrative rulings, to grant or deny exceptions and special 
permits, and to process applications for variances. The boards thus created are 
called boards of adjustment, appeal, or review. The term "board of adjustment" 
was used in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, and probably is the one 
most commonly employed • 
• • • The board of adjustment, with power to vary regulations in specific cases, 
became a standard feature of zoning administration in communities of all sizes. 
2 R • .ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§ 13.07, at 554-57 (1968). 
In Michigan the statutory term for the administrative agency with the three prin• 
cipal powers mentioned by Anderson is "board of appeals." See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 
§ 125.585 (Supp. 1974). The power to grant or deny exceptions and special permits is 
conferred by the following statutory language: "They shall also hear and decide matters 
referred to them or upon which they are required to pass under any ordinance of the 
legislative body adopted pursuant to this act." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.585(a) 
(Supp. 1974). This language is much less definite than the corresponding language in 
the STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Ar:r § 7(2) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce rev. ed. 
1926), which gives the board of adjustment the power "[t]o hear and decide special 
exceptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which such board is required to pass 
under such ordinance." In any case, the action of a board of adjustment or appeals is 
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trative" or "quasi-judicial" act. Recently, however, the Oregon8 
and Washington4 supreme courts have challenged this view, con-
cluding that, under some circumstances at least, the enactment of 
a zoning amendment should be considered an "administrative" or 
"quasi-judicial" act, and thus subject to more extensive judicial 
review. Although a majority of the Michigan supreme court has 
yet to embrace this new position, the Michigan court has been 
moving in that direction; in fact, five recent opinions by Michigan 
Supreme Court Justice Levin5 indicate that Michigan may be ex-
tending the "administrative or quasi-judicial act" doctrine even 
beyond its Washington and Oregon formulations. 
In Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington 
County,6 plaintiffs challenged the Board's approval of a zoning ordi-
nance amendment. The Oregon supreme court characterized the ac-
invariably characterized as "administrative" or "quasi-judicial." See, e.g., Clark v. 
Board of Zoning Appeals, 301 N.Y. 86, 90, 92 N.E.2d 903, 904 (1950) ("The board 
being an administrative and not a legislative body • • ."): Lorland Civic Assn. v. 
DiMatteo, 10 Mich. App. 129, 136, 157 N.W .2d 1, 5 (1968) ("It is a quasi-judicial body 
whose decisions affect private rights ••• "). 
3. See Fasano v. Board of County Commrs., 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). In re-
jecting the traditional view, the court said: "[W]e feel we would be ignoring reality to 
rigidly view all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as legislative acts to be 
accorded a full presumption of validity and shielded from less than constitutional 
scrutiny by the theory of separation of powers. Local and small decision groups are 
simply not the equivalent in all respects of state and national legislatures." 264 Ore. at 
580, 507 P .2d at 26. 
4. See Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972): Lillions 
v. Gibbs, 47 Wash. 2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955), where, although the court said, "When 
a board of county commissioners acts pursuant to a statute relating to zoning, it is a 
legislative body exercising legislative power," 47 Wash. 2d at 632, 289 P.2d at 205, the 
court apparently viewed the board's denial of a petition to rezone from a "residential" 
to a "business" classification as an "administrative act." See 47 Wash. 2d at 633-34; 289 
P.2d at 205-06. But see Durocher v. King County, 80 Wash. 2d 139, 492 P.2d 547 (1972), 
where the court held that 
-there is a difference between an act of rezoning and the granting of a permit 
pursuant to an established zoning ordinance. 
Rezoning contemplates the amendment of an existing zoning ordinance which 
changes the zoning classification of a previously zoned area, On the other 
hand, ••• the issuance of a special permit contemplates an exception granted 
pursuant to a previously existing zoning ordinance, subject to certain guides and 
standards laid down therein. 
80 Wash. 2d at 153-54, 492 P.2d at 556. The clear implication of this is that "rezoning" 
by amendment is a "legislative act," while the granting of a special permit or exception 
is an "administrative act." 
5. Sabo v. Township of Monroe, 395 Mich. -, 232 N.W.2d 584 (1975) (3-2 decision); 
Nickola v. Township of Grand Blanc, 394 Mich.-, 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975) (3·2 decision): 
Smookler v. Township of Wheatfield, 394 Mich. -, 232 N.W .2d 616 (1975) (3·2 decision): 
West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974) (plurality opinion); 
See Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 164, 215 N.W.2d 179, 190 (1974) 
(Levin, J., concurring). 
6. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P .2d 23 (1973). 
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tion of the commissioners as an exercise of "judicial" authority,7 and 
held that the landowner seeking the amendment bore the burden of 
proof that (I) the change in zoning was in accordance with the 
county's comprehensive land use plan, (2) there was a public need for 
a change of the kind in question, and (3) this need would best be 
served by changing the zoning classification of the particular piece 
of property in question. If the comprehensive plan previously desig-
nated other areas for the proposed type of development, the land-
owner would also have to show that it was necessary to introduce 
that development to a different area. 8 The zoning amendment 
adopted by the county commissioners was held invalid on the ground 
that its proponent had failed to sustain his burden of proof.9 
In Fleming v. City of Tacoma,10 the Washington supreme court 
was faced with a challenge to a zoning amendment based on the 
alleged conflict of interest of a city council member. The court stated 
that, while courts will generally not inquire into the motives of a 
legislative body acting in a legislative capacity, zoning ordinance 
amendments are basically "adjudicatory." This is so whether the 
amendment process is characterized as "legislative" or "adminis-
trative," since "the parties whose interests are affected are readily 
identifiable" and the amendments' applicability is "localized."11 
7. 264 Ore. at 581, 507 P.2d at 26. "The characterization of 'judicial' is that of the 
Oregon supreme court. Ordinarily actions of a legislative body which address a specific 
set of facts and issuance of a license, approval or permit are denominated 'quasi-
judicial,' or 'administrative.'" Freilich, supra note 1, at vii n.2. Professor Freilich went 
on to observe: 
There can be no dispute that the original passage of comprehensive plans and 
zoning ordinances is a legislative function since these actions are classified as gen-
eral policy decisions which apply to the entire community. However, a zoning 
amendment may be differentiated on the basis that such a determination is nar-
rowly confined to a particular piece of pro~erty and the use will generally affect 
only a small number of people, thus approXImating an administrative exercise. 
Id. at ix. 
8. The court further stated that although zoning changes may be justified without 
a showing of either mistake in the formation of the original comprehensive plan or 
changes in the physical characteristics of the area in question, both of these factors 
would be relevant. 264 Ore. at 587, 507 P.2d at 29. 
The "original mistake or substantial change of condition" rule has been applied 
most rigorously in Maryland. See, e.g., Helfrich v. Mongelli, 248 Md. 498, 237 A.2d 
454 (1968), and the numerous cases cited therein. See also Johar Corp. v. Rodgers Forge 
Community Assn., 236 Md. 106, 202 A.2d 612 (1964). Accord, Zoning Commn. v. New 
Canaan Bldg. Co., 146 Conn. 170, 148 A.2d 330 (1959); Roseta v. County of Washington, 
254 Ore. 161, 458 P.2d 405 (1969); Smith v. County of Washington, 241 Ore. 380, 406 P.2d 
545 (1965). The "original mistake or change of condition" rule was expressly rejected 
in Levitt v. Incorporated Village of Sands Point, 6 App. Div. 2d 701, at 701, 174 N.Y.S.2d 
283, 286 (1958), and in Oka v. Cole, 145 S.2d 233, 235 (Fla. 1962). 
9. 264 Ore. at 588, 507 P .2d at 30. 
10. 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972). 
11. 81 Wash. 2d at 298-99, 502 P .2d 330-31. 
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Thus, the court held, a municipal legislative body's hearing on a 
proposed rezoning amendment is subject on review to the Wash-
ington "appearance of fairness" doctrine, which applies in adjudi-
catory hearings both to the motives of the persons conducting the 
hearings and to the hearing procedure itself. Because there was 
evidence of a conflict of interest, the court invalidated the amend-
ment even though the vote of the councilman in question was un-
necessary for its passage.12 
In Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights,18 the Michigan supreme 
court upheld the denial of a requested zoning amendment. In his 
concurring opinion in Kropf, Justice Levin adopted a much broader 
version of the "administrative or quasi-judicial act" doctrine set out 
in the Fasano and Fleming cases. Four subsequent cases14 make it 
clear that the new doctrine is now accepted by three16 of the seven 
justices who compose the Michigan supreme court.16 
In his concurring opinion in Kropf, Justice Levin started with 
the factual assumption-no doubt correct-that "[i]n most com-
munities, . . . especially the larger ones, there have been dozens, 
12. 81 Wash. 2d at 300, 502 P .2d at 331. 
13. 391 Mich. 139, 164, 215 N.W.2d 179, 190 (1974). 
14. See Sabo v. Township of Monroe, 394 Mich.-, 232 N.W.2d 584 (1975) (3·2 deci-
sion); Nickola v. Township of Grand Blanc, 394 Mich.-, 232 N.W,2d 604 (1975) (3·2 deci-
sion); Smookler v. Township of Wheatfield, 394 Mich. -, 232 N.W .2d 616 (1975) (3-2 
decision); West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974) (plurality 
opinion). 
15. In Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974), 
only Justice T.G. Kavanagh signed the concuning opinion of Justice Levin. In the 
four subsequent decisions, cited at note 14 supra, however, they were joined by Justice 
Fitzgerald. 
16. In West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W .2d 303 (1974) (plurality 
opinion), Justices Williams, Swainson, and T.M. Kavanagh dissented in an opinion by 
Justice Willams. Justice Coleman originally signed Justice Levin's opinion in West, see 
Civ. No. 54764 (filed Sept. 6, 1974), but withdrew her signature before publication and 
merely concurred in the result. In Sabo v. Township of Monroe, 394 Mich. -, 232 
N.W .2d 584 (1975) (3·2 decision), Nickola v. Township of Grand Blanc, 394 Mich, -, 232 
N.W .2d 604 (1975) (3-2 decision), and Smookler v. Township of Wheatfield, 394 Mich. 
-, 232 N.W.2d 616 (1975) (3-2 decision), the Levin bloc was a majority because only five 
justices participated in the decision in these cases, Justice Swainson did not partici• 
pate because of pending federal criminal charges, Presumably Justice Lindemer did not 
participate because he was not appointed to fill the vacancy created by the death of 
Justice T.M. Kavanagh until after Sabo, Nickola, and Smookler were argued. In each of 
the last three cases, however, Justice Coleman, in dissent, expressly rejected Justice 
Levin's new· "administrative or quasi-judicial act" doctrine because, in her view, (1) the 
standard of "reasonableness" of the proposed use is not "workable," and (2) the new 
doctrine usurps the zoning power properly delegated to local governing bodies, makes 
the court "a super zoning board," and imposes the court's social policies on local 
communities "by judicial fiat." Justice Williams' rejection of the new doctrine was 
clearly indicated in Sabo, Nickola, and Smookler, as well as in West. The future of 
the new· doctrine is not clear because Justice Lindemer's views are still unknown and 
Justice Swainson has recently resigned from the supreme court. 
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hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of zoning map changes, ex-
ceptions and variances granted."17 He seems then to have assumed 
that the existing zoning regulations in these communities could not 
be justified as being "in accordance with a plan" designed to pro-
mote statutorily defined police power objectives as required by the 
Michigan zoning acts.18 This assumption could be correct, in a par-
ticular community, because no such plan was ever formulated, or 
the original zoning ordinance did not comply with the established 
plan, or, although the original ordinance complied with the plan, 
the present zoning regulations no longer comply due to "spot 
zoning" amendments, "special exceptions," and "variances" granted 
over the years. In such communities, concluded Justice Levin, the 
process of passing upon applications for rezoning amendments should 
be treated, in substance, as a "licensing" process in which the cri-
terion for enacting a rezoning amendment should be reasonableness 
"in light of all the circumstances."19 This appears to be in essence a 
17. 391 Mich. at 168, 215 N.W.2d at 192. 
18. Michigan's City or Village Zoning Act provides: 
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a plan designed to lessen con-
gestion on the public streets, to promote public health, safety and general welfare, 
and shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things to the 
character of the district, its peculiar suitability for particular uses, the conservation 
of property values and the general trend and character of building and population 
development. 
City or Village Zoning Act § 2, Mica. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 125.582 (1967) (emphasis 
added). The Township Rural Zoning Act provides: 
The provisions of the zoning ordinance shall be based upon a plan designed to 
promote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare, to encourage the 
use of lands in accordance with their character and adaptability and to limit the 
improper use of land, to avoid the overcrowding of population, to provide adequate 
light and air, to lessen congestion on the public roads and streets, to reduce 
hazards to life and property, to facilitate adequate provision for a system of 
transportation, sewage disposal, safe and adequate water supply, education, rec-
reation and other public requirements, and to conserve the expenditure of funds 
for public improvements and services to conform with the most advantageous uses. 
of land, resources and properties; and shall be made with reasonable consideration, 
among other things, to the character of each district, its peculiar suitability for 
J>articular uses, the conservation of property values and natural resources, and 
the general and appropriate trend and character of land, building and population 
development. 
Township Rural Zoning Act § 3, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 125.273 (1967) (emphasis 
added). 
The STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABUNG Acr § 3 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce rev. ed. 
1926) also mandates that zoning regulations be promulgated according to a plan: 
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and de-
signed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and 
other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate 
light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration 
of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewer-
age, schools, parks, and other public requirements. 
(Emphasis added). The draftsmen's comment on this provision is that "{t]his will 
prevent haphazard or piecemeal zoning. No zoning should be done without such a 
comprehensive study." 
19. 391 Mich. at 172, 215 N.W.2d at 194. 
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sophisticated "nuisance" test that would take into account "avail-
ability of utilities and roads," "[a]esthetics," and the requirements of 
"sound communal development,'' as well as other factors tradition-
ally considered in nuisance litigation.20 
While Justice Levin would, like the Fasano court, continue to 
assign the burden of proof of the "reasonableness" of the proposed 
use to the property owner seeking the change,21 he would hold that 
local legislative bodies making zoning decisions on individual 
grounds "are exercising administrative, not legislative, power and 
cannot claim for such determinations the presumption which shields 
legislative action."22 Once these determinations are characterized as 
administrative acts, "the reasonableness of the proposed use-the 
standard in fact generally followed by a local legislative body when 
granting or refusing a change-is, under [the Michigan] constitution, 
subject to judicial review. The question on review is whether the 
grant or denial is 'supported by competent, material and substantial 
evidence on the whole record.' "23 
The "administrative act" doctrine propounded by Justice Levin 
in Kropf goes far beyond the doctrine announced in Fasano, Fleming, 
or any other decision characterizing the grant or denial of rezoning 
applications as "administrative" or "quasi-judicial." The Fasano24 
opinion emphasized that Oregon county planning commissioners are 
required "to adopt ... comprehensive plan[s] for the use of some 
or all of the land in the county,"25 that "the purpose of the zoning 
ordinances ... is to 'carry out' or implement [these] plan[s],"26 and 
that "the plan[s] adopted by the planning commission[s] and the 
zoning ordinances enacted by the county governing bod[ies] are 
closely related .... "27 The Oregon court was principally concerned 
with preventing unwarranted changes in the zoning regulations, 
which might result from "the almost irresistible pressures that can 
20. 391 Mich. at 173, 215 N.W.2d at 194. For an interesting argument that zoning 
should be scrapped and replaced by "nuisance rules," at least in part, sec Ellickson, 
Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 
40 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 681 (1973). 
21. 391 Mich. at 172, 215 N.W.2d at 194. 
22. 391 Mich. at 171, 215 N.W.2d at 193. 
23. 391 Mich. at 169-70, 215 N.W.2d at 192-93. The quoted standard is that pre• 
scribed by the Michigan constitution for judicial review of "judicial or quasi-judicial" 
administrative decisions affecting "private rights or licenses." See MICH. CoNsr. art. 6, 
§ 28. See also text at notes 36-46 infra. 
24. See text at notes 6-9 supra. 
25. 264 Ore. at 582,507 P.2d at 27. 
26. 264 Ore. at 582, 507 P .2d at 27. 
27. 264 Ore. at 582,507 P.2d at 27. 
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be asserted by private economic interests on local government."28 
Thus the court, in substance, recognized a strong presumption that 
the original zoning of an area pursuant to a comprehensive plan is 
reasonable and that it should not be changed unless the proponent 
of a rezoning amendment has successfully carried a very heavy bur-
den of proof. Fasano certainly is not authority for Justice Levin's 
proposition that, upon judicial review of a local governing body's 
actions with regard to a rezoning amendment, the only question is 
whether the "proposed use is reasonable."29 
Fleming provides even less support for Justice Levin's proposi-
tion. This decision does support the general notion that a zoning 
amendment affecting a single tract is "administrative" or "quasi-
judicial" rather than "legislative" in character. But Fleming does 
not deal either with the presumptions and burden of proof to be 
applied in the "administrative" or "quasi-judicial" hearing, or with 
the standard to be applied on judicial review of the governing body's 
action in granting or denying the proposed change in zoning. 
Justice Levin's approach to the rezoning problem has apparent 
merit when applied to local governing bodies that have engaged in 
illegal "spot zoning"30 over an extended period of time, and thus 
have made no real effort to keep their zoning regulations "in ac-
28. 264 Ore. at 588, 507 P .2d at 30. 
29. 391 Mich. at 171, 215 N.W.2d at 193 (footnote omitted). See text at note 23 
supra. 
30. For general discussion of "spot zoning'' and zoning changes by amendment, see 
I A. RATHKOPF, supra note I, chs. 26-27; 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 2, chs. 4-5. Rathkopf 
has succinctly characterized "spot zoning" as follows: 
"Spot zoning'' is the practice whereby a single lot or area is granted privileges 
which are not granted or extended to other land in the vicinity in the same use 
district •••• 
The uniform rule as set out in all of the cases is that consistency between the 
treatment accorded the parcel rezoned and the scheme of zoning set out in the 
general or comprehensive plan is the essential test. 
1 A. R.ATHKOPF, supra, at 26-1, 26-5. 
Relatively few Michigan decisions have discussed challenged zoning amendments 
in terms of "spot zoning." While varying considerably in their factual contexts and 
results, most of the decisions that have discussed the issue have used the term "spot 
zoning" at it has traditionally been used: to describe a rezoning that gives preferential 
treatment to a particular lot or lots. See, e.g., Hungerford v. Township of Dearborn, 
362 Mich. 126, 106 N.W .2d 566 (1960); Penning v. Owens, 340 Mich. 355, 65 N.W .2d 831 
(1954); Yale Dev. Co. v. City of Portage, 11 Mich. App. 83, 160 N.W .2d 604 (1968). In 
Trenton Development Co. v. Village of Trenton, 345 Mich. 353, 75 N.W.2d 814 (1956), 
however, the rezoning of a three-block area in a large multi-family district to a two-
family classification, where the area rezoned adjoined a business district, was said to 
be unreasonable "spot zoning." The problem with the Trenton court's approach · is 
that a rezoning that covers an area as large as three blocks may in fact represent a 
valid change in the land use plan, rather than an abandonment of that plan. See text 
at notes 47-48 infra. 
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cordance with" a comprehensive land use plan.81 It may also have 
merit when applied to a jurisdiction that has no such plan. If rezon-
ing decisions are usually made without reference to the existing land 
use plan, a local governing body would act in an arbitrary and dis-
criminatory manner if it should deny a particular application for 
rezoning that is "reasonable under all the circumstances" on the 
ground that the change would not comport with the plan; similarly, 
the denial of a "reasonable" application would be arbitrary in the 
absence of a land use plan. It can therefore be argued that in either 
of these situations the proponent should be entitled on judicial re-
view to a court order requiring adoption of the proposed zoning 
amendment. 
Despite its superficial attractiveness, however, Justice Levin's 
review standard presents a number of conceptual and practical 
problems. First, as Justice Levin noted in Kropf,82 a local governing 
body's action in refusing a proposed rezoning has traditionally been 
subject to attack only indirectly through a constitutional challenge 
to the validity of the existing zoning regulations as applied to the 
challenger's property.83 A court order requiring adoption of a pro-
posed zoning amendment involves an assumption of judicial power 
to dictate affirmative action by a local governing body that courts 
have traditionally been unwilling to assume.84 In Michigan there 
31. At least one Michigan case has held that numerous "spot-zonings" destroyed 
a city's comprehensive area plan. See Schaefer v. City of East Detroit, 360 Mich. 536, 
104 N.W.2d 390 (1960). 
32. 391 Mich. at 164, 171 n.6, 215 N.W.2d at 190, 193 n.6. 
33. The existing regulations have traditionally been held valid so long as they 
allow some "reasonable use" of the property in question, See, e.g., Village of Delle 
Terre v. Doraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 
(1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal dis-
missed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962). 
34. See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 22.08, at 612: 
Mandamus is not available to compel the legislative authority of a municipality 
to amend a zoning ordinance. The amendment of the zoning ordinance is a matter 
committed to the legislative discretion of the municipal legislative body, and such 
action may not be compelled by prerogative writ. To compel legislative action 
through a writ of mandamus would be to interfere with an exercise of legislative 
discretion, and this may not be done short of an abuse of such discretion, 
Courts are generally reluctant to conclude that a local governing body has abused 
its discretion in denying a proposed rezoning amendment. For example, in Lilllons v, 
Gibbs, 47 Wash. 2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955), the court said: 
Mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of acts or duties which call 
for the exercise of discretion on the part of public officers • • • • Where courts do 
interfere, it is upon the theory that the action is so arbitrary and capricious as 
to evidence a total failure to exercise discretion, and therefore the act of the 
officer is invalid •••• 
Arbitrary and capricious action of administrative bodies means willful and 
unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances, 
Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when 
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is a clear statutory basis for this reluctance. If a court on judicial 
review is to determine that the proposed use for which rezoning is 
sought is "reasonable under all the circumstances" and that rezoning 
must therefore be granted, the court would be usurping a legislative 
function delegated by the Michigan zoning acts to local governing 
bodies.M 
Second, even if Justice Levin's "administrative or quasi-judicial" 
characterization is accepted, his concurring opinion in Kropf leaves 
doubt as to precisely what standard of judicial review is being pro-
posed. At one point Justice Levin states that the proper standard is 
the Michigan constitution's standard for judicial review of admin-
istrative agency "judicial or quasi-judicial" findings of fact-
"whether the grant or denial is 'supported by competent, material 
and substantial evidence on the whole record.' "36 Later, however, in 
exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed 
that an erroneous conclusion has been reached. 
Under the facts in this case, there was room for two opinions [regarding re-
zoning from "residential" to "business" use]. This was shown by the testimony that 
there were those who favored and others who protested the adoption of the com-
mission's recommendation [to rezone to a "business" classification]. At the trial, 
the appellant had the burden of proof, and failed to establish that the board acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously, as above defined [in refusing to rezone]. 
47 Wash. 2d at 633-34, 289 P.2d at 205-06. But see Aspen Hill Venture v. Montgomery 
County Council, 265 Md. 303, 289 A.2d 303 (1972), where the court held the refusal to 
rezone to permit expansion of an existing shopping center arbitrary, unreasonable, 
and capricious. After a hearing, the County Council had found that there was sufficient 
change in the character of the neighborhood to justify rezoning, that the proposed 
rezoning was in accordance with the Master Plan, and that the proposed rezoning 
would not have an adverse effect on surrounding residential property or create traffic 
circulation problems or any additional nuisance factor in the area; nevertheless, the 
Council denied the application for rezoning from residential to commercial use solely 
on the ground that there was no need for additional commercial facilities in the area. 
The court noted that the Council's decision was really nothing more than "substituting 
an economic judgment of its own for that of the shopping center's entrepreneur, as 
to the financial success of the venture." 265 Md. at 314, 289 A.2d at 309. The court 
added that 
while a zoning designation on a Master Plan may not support an immediate request 
for rezoning, as it is a gnide for the future, yet, when, as here, it is accompanied 
by the dynamics of change, we think the designation on the Master Plan becomes 
most significant •••• Thus, the ignoring of the Master Plan, under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, serves to emphasize the lack of substantial relationship 
between the exercise of the police power and the public interest. 
265 Md. at 314-15, 289 A.2d at 309. 
35. See City or Village Zoning Act § 4, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.584 (1967); 
Township Rural Zoning Act § 14, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.284 (Supp. 1974). 
This enlargement of judicial power would be particularly troublesome in cases where, 
pursuant to the "20 per cent protest" provision of the City or Village Zoning Act, a 
rezoning amendment "shall not be passed except by the ¾ vote of such legislative 
body." City or Village Zoning Act§ 4, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 125.584 (1967). 
36. 391 Mich. at 169-70, 215 N.W.2d at 193. See text at note 23 supra. The constitu-
tional standard in full is as follows: 
All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative officer or 
agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasi-
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a footnote, Justice Levin seems to suggest that proper judicial review 
requires the reviewing court to substitute its own judgment for that 
of the local legislative body.87 This is clearly improper if the rezoning 
issue before the court is characterized as "factual,"88 but it may be 
that Justice Levin views rezoning as a "legal" issue.80 
Judicial substitution of judgment ("de novo review") is common 
in both federal and state courts when the issue for review is the 
propriety of an agency's application of the law to established or 
undisputed facts.40 But the United States Supreme Court has often 
rejected the substitution-of-judgment approach in favor of a "ratio-
nal basis" standard of judicial review-i.e., the agency's decision will 
be sustained if it has "warrant in the record and rational basis in 
law."41 Many state courts have also adopted this approach.42 Al-
though Professor Davis concludes that a court's choice of approach 
in a particular case is essentially discretionary,48 the "rational basis" 
standard seems preferable when a Michigan court is reviewing local 
rezoning decisions. This is so because (1) whether it is viewed as a 
legislative or an administrative unit, the local governing body seems 
better qualified than a court to make individualized rezoning deci-
sions involving the application of general propositions of zoning law 
judicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review by 
the courts as provided by law. This review shall include, as a minimum, the 
determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders arc au-
thorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same 
are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole 
record. 
MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 28. 
37. The note states: 
Under existing precedent the question on judicial review varies depending on 
whether a change in zoning has been granted or denied: When a change is granted 
and an adjoining property owner ••• challenges the change, the question on review 
is whether the newly permitted use, the proposed use, is reasonable; when a 
change is denied and the owner of the property affected challenges the denial, 
the question on review is whether the present use is reasonable. Since the q_uestion 
on judicial revieiv is in every case whether a proposed use should be permitted, it 
is anomalous for the scales to be weighted depending on who won or lost below. 
391 Mich. at 171 n.6, 215 N.W.2d at 193 n.6 (emphasis original). 
38. See Regents of University of Michigan v. Michigan Employment Relations 
Commn., 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W .2d 218 (1973); Williams v. Arnold Cleaners, Inc., 25 
Mich. App. 672, 181 N.W .2d 625 (1970). 
39. In this connection, we need to keep in mind Professor Davis' admonition: "In 
the context of judicial review of administrative action the term 'question of fact' 
means an administrative question on which a reviei'ling court should not substitute 
judgment and the term 'question of law' means a question on which the reviewing 
court may properly substitute judgment." K. DAVIS, ADMINISIRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 30.02, at 193 (1958). 
40. Id. § 30.06 (1958, Supp. 1970). 
41. Id. § 30.05, at 214. 
42. Id. § 30.05, at 220-21. 
43. Id. § 30.08. 
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to unique facts;44 (2) the state legislature has clearly conferred power 
to make such decisions on the local governing body;45 and (3) the 
Michigan constitution's judicial review standard for administrative 
agency "judicial or quasi-judicial" determinations indicates on its 
face that the "rational basis" standard applies.46 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if the "administrative or 
quasi-judicial act" doctrine announced by Justice Levin should be-
come law in Michigan, the courts will be faced in many cases with 
the difficult problem of deciding when a community, by virtue of 
its past zoning practices, is subject to the new doctrine. In his con-
curring opinion in Kropf, Justice Levin said: 
When in fact, as well as theory, zoning is legislative, the legislative 
body adopts on general, not individualized, grounds a plan of general 
application to all the land in the community and stops there-with 
variances granted only when constitutional necessity requires it-
there are no determinations on individual grounds subject to . . . 
judicial review and the zoning choices of the legislative body are 
clothed with a presumption of constitutionality.47 
But surely a community's original zoning ordinance is not im-
mutable. Comprehensive ordinance revisions based on changing 
conditions should be considered "legislative" and should not lose 
their traditional presumption of validity or subject the community 
to the new "administrative or quasi-judicial act" doctrine. Nor should 
an occasional instance of unwarranted "spot zoning" or an un-
justified grant of a "variance" have that effect.48 Thus, in many cases 
44. Professor Davis discusses in detail three major factors that guide courts in 
choosing between the "substitution of judgment" and the "rational basis" approaches: 
"the comparative qualifications of courts and agencies, the degree of legislative com-
mitment of power to agencies, and the distinction between the enunciation of general 
principle and the application of legal concepts to unique facts." Id. §§ 30.09-.11. See 
also id. §§ 30.01-.04, 30.13, 30.14. 
45. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
46. See note 36 supra; text at note 23 supra. 
47. 391 Mich. at 170-71, 215 N.W.2d at 193 (emphasis original). 
48. The present writer has not found any empirical study that supports Justice 
Levin's suspicion that many variances are in fact improperly granted in Michigan; 
nor is the writer aware of any empirical study of "special exceptions" that would sup-
port an assumption that they are usually, or even frequently, granted on improper 
grounds. Moreover, it may not be fair to charge against the local governing body the 
derelictions of the zoning board of appeals in granting variances and/or special excep-
tions on improper grounds. In theory, of course, adequate standards for granting "special 
exceptions" will be set forth in the local zoning ordinance, and any "special exception" 
granted in accordance with such standards is deemed to be "entirely appropriate and 
not essentially incompatible with the basic uses" in the zone or zones where it is 
authorized by the ordinance. Tullo v. Township of Millburn, 54 N.J. Super. 483, 490, 
149 A.2d 620, 624-25 (App. Div. 1959). 
It is interesting to note that the Michigan Court of Appeals has only recently fol-
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a court would have a difficult initial classification problem before it 
could apply the new doctrine. 
It is rather ironic that the disregard by many Michigan local 
governing bodies of the statutory requirement that zoning regula-
tions be "in accordance with a plan"49 is in large part a result of the 
Michigan supreme court's historic bias in favor of "property rights" 
and against "planning" as a basis for governmental land use controls. 
As the present writer has previously pointed out: 
Michigan courts have rarely referred to the statutory zoning plan 
requirement. In two cases in which the minimum lot-size regulations 
under attack were designed to carry out a comprehensive zoning plan 
based upon a full-blo'wn "master plan" of the type envisaged in the 
Michigan Municipal Planning Commission Act, the lot-size require-
ments were held invalid primarily on the ground that it was un-
reasonable for the municipalities to plan so far ahead and to try to 
control the density of population by means of substantial lot mini-
mums in the absence of a present direct threat to the public health, 
safety, and welfare. The decisions were supported by a line of cases 
beginning ·with Gust v. Canton Township,50 in which the court 
concluded its opinion with the statement that "the test of validity 
is not whether the [zoning] prohibition may at some time in the 
future bear a real and substantial relationship to the public health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare, but whether it does so now."G1 
The article quoted above expressed the hope that Padover v. 
Township of Farmingtonli2 marked the final rejection of "the restric-
tive Gust formula" and the acceptance of "long-range planning" as a 
proper basis for zoning regulations.GB Unfortunately, this hope has 
not been borne out by subsequent Michigan decisions. In Biske v. 
lowed the lead of New York in holding that, while an applicant for a "use variance" 
must show "unnecessary hardship," i.e., that without a variance no "reasonable use" 
of the property is possible, so that there would be an unconstitutional deprivation of 
property unless the variance is granted, an applicant for a "nonuse variance" relaxing 
an area, height, bulk, or placement regulation need only show "practical difficulties" 
as a basis for the variance sought. See, e.g., Puritan-Greenfield Improvement Assn. v. 
Leo, 7 Mich. App. 659, 153 N.W .2d 162 (1967). It is clear that the new "practical diffi-
culties" standard for "nonuse variances" does not satisfy the test of "constitutional 
necessity'' apparently assumed by Justice Levin in Kropf to be the only proper test. 
See 391 Mich. at 171,215 N.W.2d at 193. But the use of the new "practical difficulties" 
test in Michigan can hardly be deemed an abuse of power by local zoning boards of 
appeals. 
49. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
50. 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W .2d 772 (1955) (footnote renumbered). 
51. Cunningham, Zoning Law in Michigan and New Jersey: A Comparative Study, 
63 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1171, 1187 (1965) (footnote omitted). 
52. 372 Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687 (1965). 
53. Cunningham, supra note 51, at 1187. 
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City of Troy,54 for example, the court recently echoed the distrust 
of "planning" that characterized Gust and many earlier Michigan 
cases. The tendency of the Michigan supreme court to discount 
"planning" as a proper basis for zoning regulations can hardly have 
encouraged Michigan local governing bodies to develop comprehen-
sive land use plans and to make a serious effort to base their zoning 
regulations thereon. Justice Levin's new doctrine, which purports 
to be a response to the weakness of local planning, might actually 
have the effect (if not the intent) of further undermining Michigan 
communities' efforts at planned land use control. 
Unfortunately, Justice Levin's concurring opinion in Kropf shows 
little understanding of the nature of comprehensive land use plans 
and their relation to zoning regulations. He appears to assume55 that 
both a comprehensive land use plan and the zoning regulations based 
upon it can be static and immutable, so that rezoning of particular 
tracts would never be necessary or justified and the only changes in 
the zoning regulations would be those resulting from the granting of 
"hardship" variances56 by the local zoning board of appeals. This 
assumption is unrealistic: No comprehensive land use plan should be 
as definite and precise as the zoning regulations based upon it, and 
even the best land use plan must be revised over time in response to 
population growth, dispersion of industrial and commercial ac-
tivities, and other demographic and economic changes. A far better 
understanding of the nature of a comprehensive land use plan and its 
relation to zoning regulations is demonstrated in Fasano, where the 
Supreme Court of Oregon said: 
The comprehensive plan might provide that its goal for residential 
development is to assure that residential areas are healthful, 
pleasant and safe places in which to live ... [and list policies that] 
are to be pursued in achieving that goal . . . . Under such a hypo-
thetical plan, property originally zoned for single family dwellings 
might later be rezoned for duplexes, for garden apartments, or for 
high-rise apartment buildings. Each of these changes could be shown 
to be consistent with the plan. Although in addition we would re-
quire a showing that the county governing body found a bona fide 
need for a zone change in order to accommodate new high-density 
development which at least balanced the disruption shown by the 
challengers, that requirement would be met in most instances by a 
record which disclosed that the governing body had considered the 
facts relevant to this question and exercised its judgment in good 
54. 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W .2d 453 (1969). But see Sabo v. Township of Wheatfield, 
394 Mich. -, 232 N.W .2d 584 (1975) (Williams, J., di~enting). 
55. See text at note 47 supra. 
56. See note 48 supra. 
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faith. However, these changes, while all could be shown to be con-
sistent with the plan, could be expected to have differing impacts 
on the surrounding area, depending on the nature of that area. As 
the potential impact on the area in question increases, so will the 
necessity to show a justification.117 
The Fasano approach suggests that the Michigan courts should 
continue to apply a presumption that a local governing body's action 
in either adopting or rejecting a proposed rezoning is valid, so long 
as the action purports to be based upon the community's compre-
hensive land use plan. Under Fasano, where such a plan has been 
adopted, a third party challenging the validity of a zoning amend-
ment would have the burden of showing that the rezoning is not con-
sistent with the plan, that the plan itself is not "reasonable," or that 
the disruption of existing land uses outweighs any asserted need for 
a zone change; a landowner challenging the denial of a proposed 
rezoning would have the burden of showing that the rezoning would 
be consistent with the plan or that the plan itself is unreasonable, 
and, in either case, that the need for the proposed zone change is 
at least great enough to balance the disruption of existing land uses 
that would result from the change.68 
. One further aspect of Justice Levin's concurring opinion in 
Kropf should be mentioned, as he touched upon another area of 
Michigan zoning law that needs to be clarified to permit effective 
coordination of land use planning and control. By stating that "[a] 
property owner seeking a change" in zoning "may properly be re-
quired to show what he intends to build, to present site, floor and 
exterior design plans,"59 Justice Levin indicated that he believes 
approval of a requested rezoning can be conditioned upon the ap-
plicant's adherence to these plans if they are presented to the local 
governing body at the time rezoning is sought. Unfortunately, how-
ever, while "contract" or "conditional" rezoning procedures have 
been judicially approved in a number of states,60 no Michigan statute 
57. 264 Ore. at 586 n.3, 507 P.2d. at 29 n.3. 
58. But note that this standard is nevertheless stricter than the constitutional "no 
reasonable use" standard traditionally applied on review of "legislative" zoning. See 
notes ,33 &: 48 supra. In both Fasano and Fleming the "administrative" or "quasi-
judidal" characterization was employed to allow the court to invalidate zoning amend• 
ments. The effect of the new standard might be even more striking on review of a 
denial of rezoning, which is virtually nonreviewable under the traditional standard. 
59. 391 Mich. at 172-73, 215 N.W.2d at 194. 
60. See, e.g., Sylvania Electric Products Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 
N.E.2d 118 (1962): Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 168 N.E.2d 680, 683, 203 
N.Y.S.2d 866, 869 (1960); State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N,W.2d 
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or case law yet authorizes local governing bodies to condition zoning 
amendments upon compliance with such plans. Neither is it clear 
whether a landowner can be held to his representations, either by 
means of a covenant between the landowner and the local governing 
body or by an express condition embodied in the zoning amend-
ment. 61 Therefore, after obtaining a requested rezoning, a landowner 
could arguably scrap the plans he had presented and build in bare 
compliance with the zoning regulations applicable under the new 
classification. As an alternative to "contract" or "conditional" rezon-
ing procedures, a local governing body might withhold building per-
mits or certificates of occupancy for construction not in accordance 
with the plans submitted at the time of the rezoning request, but the 
validity of this practice is likewise unsettled in Michigan. 
Notwithstanding the objections noted above, Justice Levin's "ad-
ministrative or quasi-judicial act" doctrine as announced in Kropf 
may well become the law in Michigan. Should this be the case several 
changes in local zoning procedure will be necessary to increase the 
likelihood that the grant or denial of a requested zoning amendment 
will be upheld as being in accord with a comprehensive plan. For 
instance, the zoning body must ensure that there is a procedurally 
valid plan. The Michigan Municipal Planning Act,62 like most plan-. 
ning enabling legislation,63 provides for formal adoption of the land 
use plan by the local planning commission. If the community has a 
planning commission, it would appear that the comprehensive land 
use plan must be formally adopted by the planning commission (no 
matter who was responsible for the plan's initial formulation) before 
it ·will be entitled to judicial deference. In Biske v. City of Troy,64 
the Michigan supreme court refused to give substantial weight to the 
city's "master plan" on the issue of the reasonableness of the city's 
zoning ordinance as it affected a particular tract of land, because the 
533 (1970). Contra, Harxnett v. Austin, 93 S.2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Carole Highlands Citi-
zens Assn., Inc. v. Board of County Commrs., 222 Md. 44, 158 A.2d 663 (1960). For 
general discussions of "contract" and "conditional" rezoning, see Shapiro, The Case 
for Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 267 (1968); Note, Contract and Conditional 
Zoning: A Tool for Zoning Flexibility, 23 HAsTINGS L.J. 825 (1972). 
61. "At least where no fraud is shown, a property owner may use his land for 
any purpose permitted by its zoning, regardless of the fact that his predecessor in 
title had represented to municipal officials, when the zoning was enacted, that the 
property would be used for another purpose." C. CRAWFORD, MICHIGAN ZONING AND , 
PLANNING § 12.10[1], at 12-21 (1967). 
62. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 125.38 (1967). 
63. See STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT § 6 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1928). 
64. 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969). 
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plan had not been "adopted pursuant to the procedure required by 
section 8 of the [Municipal Planning Act]."65 On the policy issue, the 
court stated, "If a 'master plan' is going to be adopted by a com-
munity, such plan should at least be adopted formally by the com-
munity, and the community be given an opportunity to pass on it in 
accordance with the statute."66 The statute and case law leave open 
the question whether any community can have a comprehensive land 
use plan entitled to judicial deference in zoning litigation if the 
community does not have a planning commission. It is at least argu-
able that, in such a community, a comprehensive plan formally 
adopted by resolution of the local governing body should be entitled 
to judicial deference even though the plan was initially formulated 
either by the municipal planning staff or by a planning consultant.07 
If Justice Levin's position is adopted, changes must also be made 
in the procedure for handling applications for rezoning at the local 
government level. Under his Kropf doctrine, "[t]he determination 
granting or denying alike is subject to judicial review on the record 
in accordance with the standard prescribed in the constitution."68 
Since this would require that zoning amendments be granted upon 
the request of a property owner who can sustain his burden of proof 
on the issue of reasonableness, in communities not currently provid-
65. 381 Mich. at 616, 166 N.W.2d at 456. 
66. 381 Mich. at 615, 166 N.W.2d at 456. Presumably the court had in mind, in 
speaking of formal adoption "by the community," the provision in section 8 of the 
Municipal Planning Commission Act authorizing the planning commission to "adopt 
the [master] plan as a whole by a single resolution or ••• by successive resolutions 
adopt successive parts of the plan, said parts corresponding with major geographical 
sections or divisions of the municipality or with functional subdivisions of the subject 
matter of the plan •••• " MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 125.38 (1967). The court's state-
ment that the community should have "an opportunity to pass on [the plan] in 
accordance with the statute" presumably refers to the requirement that "the commis• 
sion shall hold at least 1 public hearing thereon," after notice, before the adoption 
of the plan or any part thereof. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 125.38 (1967). 
67. Formal adoption by resolution of the local governing body should meet the 
requirement of community participation as stated in Biske, see 381 Mich. at 615, 166 
N.W .2d at 456, if adoption is preceded by at least one public hearing. In most juris• 
dictions the courts have concluded that the "comprehensive" zoning plan need not 
be embodied in a separate form outside the zoning ordinance itself. See, e.g., Kozesnik 
v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957) ("A plan may readily 
be revealed in an end-product-here the zoning ordinance-and no more is required 
by the statute''); Joblon v. Town Planning and Zoning Commn., 157 Conn. 434, 254 
A.2d 914 (1969) ("The comprehensive plan is found in the zoning regulations them• 
· selves and the zoning map"). For the classic discussion of the "comprehensive plan" 
requirement, see Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV, L. REv. 
1154 (1955). 
68. 391 Mich. at 171, 215 N.W.2d at 193. The review standard is discussed in the 
text at notes 36-46 supra. 
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ing for initiation of rezoning proposals by landowner petition, the 
zoning ordinance would have to be revised to authorize such a 
procedure. In such communities, as well as those where the lo-
cal zoning ordinance now provides for initiation of rezoning pro-
posals by landmvner petition,69 adoption of Justice Levin's views 
would also require an administrative hearing on each landowner's 
petition for rezoning (if not already required by the local zoning 
ordinance)70 and the preservation of a record of such a hearing, 
including findings of fact in every case.71 
Other local procedural changes can be suggested in order to en-
sure that the grant or denial of zoning amendments will be ac-
corded judicial deference, should Justice Levin's "administrative or 
quasi-judicial act" doctrine be adopted by a majority of the Michigan 
supreme court. One Michigan municipal attorney recently suggested 
that communities "update" their zoning ordinances every year or two 
to coincide with changes in their land use development plan, rather 
than acting on individual rezoning requests.72 He pointed out that 
"[t]here are six uses for every property which are not unreasonable" 
in suburban areas, and since reasonableness of the proposed use is all 
that must be shmm to justify a zoning change under Justice Levin's 
approach, Michigan municipalities that persist in a case-by-case ap-
proach to the rezoning process may find that the initiative in zoning 
matters has been taken from them and placed in the hands of prop-
erty mmers and developers.78 
Action at the municipal level alone cannot solve the problems 
that currently beset Michigan zoning law, however. The Michigan 
legislature should thoroughly revise the state zoning enabling acts. 
The City or Village Zoning Act74 and the current Township Rural 
69. See, e.g., ANN ARBOR CITY CODE, ch. 55 (Zoning), §§ 5.107-.108 (1974). "Prob-
ably most petitions for amendment are filed by individual property owners who 
desire rezoning of their particular property. The enabling act [however] seldom refers 
to the right of the property owners to initiate such rezoning." 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra 
note 1, at 27-24. The Michigan zoning acts do not contain provisions authorizing 
property owners to initiate zoning amendments. Neither did the Standard State Zoning 
Enabling Act. 
70. See, e.g., ANN ARBoR CITY CODE, ch. 55 (Zoning), § 5.107(5)(a) (1974), requiring 
a public hearing in all cases "before adoption of any proposed amendment," whether 
the amendment is initiated by the City Council, by the Planning Commission, or by 
petition. 
71. See text at note 68 supra. 
72. Joseph T. Brennan, attorney for West Bloomfield Township and Green Oak 
Township, quoted in Brighton Argus, Oct. 9, 1974, at 1, cols. 4-8; The Observer and 
Eccentric r,;. Bloomfield, Mich.), Oct. 14, 1974, at I, cols. 3-6. 
73. See Brighton Argus, Oct. 9, 1974, at I, cols. 4-8. 
74. MrcH. CoMl'. LAws ANN. §§ 125.581-91 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1974). 
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Zoning Act75 have not been substantially amended since their enact-
ment in 1921 and 1943, respectively. An extensive discussion of the 
needed revisions is beyond the scope of this article, but such revisions 
might profitably draw upon the American Law Institute's proposed 
Model Land Development Code.76 
In general, the Model Code would allow all local governments, 
without previously adopting a land use plan, to adopt "development 
ordinances," "requiring that development in their jurisdictions be 
undertaken in accordance with the terms of the ordinance and that 
it be undertaken only after grant of a development permit."77 But 
the Model Code also creates an incentive for planning by granting 
to local governments that adopt Land Development Plans additional 
powers not available to other local governments.78 Thus the Land 
75. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.271-.301 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1974). The 
Township Zoning Enabling Act of 1937 was repealed when the current Township Rural 
Zoning Act was enacted in 1943. The current County Rural Zoning Act, MICH, COMP. 
LAws ANN. §§ 125.201-.32 (1967), is not heavily used. Only 27 of the 83 Michigan 
counties currently have county zoning ordinances in effect, and none of these is 
in the populous southeast area of the state. Telephone interview with Lawrence Folks, 
Office of Land Use, Michigan Department of Natural Resources, July 17, 1975. Re-
search disclosed only two reported cases dealing with county zoning in Michigan. See 
County of Barry v. Edmonds, 25 Mich. App. 589, 181 N.W .2d 599 (1970); Nelson v. 
Goddard, 43 Mich. App. 615, 204 N.W.2d 739 (1972) (Cheboygan County Interim [Short-
Term] Zoning Ordinance). It should be noted that county zoning ordinances do not 
apply to incorporated cities or villages, see MICH. COMP. LAws ANN, § 125.201 (1967), 
or to any township that has adopted a zoning ordinance under the Township Rural 
Zoning Act. See MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 125.297 (1967). 
76. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1974). 
The comments to the Code describe its relevant features as follows: 
I. It requires that zoning and subdivision regulations be combined in a single 
"development ordinance" (§ 2-101(1)); 
2. It requires that the development ordinance be administered by a single 
"Land Development Agency" (§ 2-102) but grants the local government great 
flexibility in designating who shall act as the Land Development Agency (§ 2-
301(1)) and grants the Agency great flexibility in delegating functions to other 
officers, boards or committees (§ 2-301(2)); 
3. It establishes in some detail the administrative procedures to be used by 
the Land Development Agency (§§ 2-303-06); 
4. It attempts to discourage the local legislative body from becoming involved 
in individual development proposals (§ 2-312). 
ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPllfENT CoDE, art. 2, Commentary, at 34 (Proposed Official 
Draft No. I, 1974). 
The Model Code also provides for state land development regulation, including 
appeals in certain cases from orders of any local Land Development Agency to a 
State Land Adjudicatory Board. See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, art. 7 
(Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1974). 
77. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-101 (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 
1974). 
78. See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-210(1) ("A development ordinance 
may authorize the Land Development Agency to grant special development permission 
for a planned unit development by specifying the types or characteristics of devel-
opment that may be permitted, which may differ from one part of the community 
to another"): § 2-211(1) ("A development ordinance may authorize the Land Devel• 
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Development Agency of a local government that has adopted a Land 
Development Plan may handle certain "special development" pro-
posals through a permit procedure operating under preestablished 
guidelines conforming to the Land Development Plan.79 The Land 
Development Agency may be either the "local governing body or any 
committee, commission, board or officer of the local government."80 
A uniform system of judicial review of local government land 
development decisions would also be established by the Model 
Code,81 which provides, inter alia, as follows: "In a proceeding con-
cerning the relationship of an order, rule or ordinance, to the public 
health, safety or welfare, the court shall give due weight to the fact 
that the order, rule or ordinance was adopted by a local government 
having a Land Development Plan and to the consistency of the chal-
lenged action with the applicable state or local Land Development 
Plan."82 Enactment of this provision of the Model Code would appear 
to assure that where a Land Development Plan has been adopted, the 
local government's land use control decisions consistent with the Plan 
will be accorded a judicial presumption of validity. 
Justice Levin's review standard would frequently deprive local 
zoning decisions of this presumption of validity. While this may be 
·warranted on policy grounds where localities in fact engage in ex-
tensive "spot zoning," Justice Levin's proposed standard cuts too 
wide a swath. It might invalidate local zoning decisions in many 
cases in which the local bodies were responsibly reacting to changed 
conditions. The Michigan courts should instead recognize that local 
land use plans and zoning ordinances must be responsive to change, 
and continue to apply the legislative presumption of validity where a 
land use plan has been adopted. Judicial failure to adhere to this 
established doctrine would raise serious questions concerning sepa-
opment Agency to designate by rule specially planned areas in which development will 
be permitted only in accordance with a plan of development for the entire area"); 
§ 2-212 ("The development ordinance of a planning government may authorize the 
Land Development Agency to grant special permission for development which is con-
sistent with the local government's Land Development Plan, but which is not per-
mitted as a general development •• .'') (Proposed Official Draft No. I, 1974). 
79. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CoDE §§ 2-210 to -212 (Proposed Official Draft 
No. I, 1974). 
80. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-301 (Proposed Official Draft No. I, 
1974). 
81. See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CoDE art. 9 (Proposed Official Draft No. I, 
1974) (Appendix A). 
82, ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CoDE § 9-109(3) (Proposed Official Draft No. I, 
1974) (Appendix A). 
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ration of powers, require extensive local procedural changes, and 
undermine local efforts to control land use.83 The ultimate solution, 
however, must come through revision of state statutes governing 
both the exercise and judicial review of local land use control powers. 
83. See Justice Coleman's view, supporting the text, at note 16 supra. 
